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Abstract
In the present study, the effect of market compe-
tition on the agency costs was examined in the com-
panies listed in Tehran stock exchange. For this pur-
pose, 56 companies were examined in 2005–2010.
The selected approach benefits from Panel Data to 
test the hypotheses and the natural logarithm of au-
diting fees and operational costs ratio were consid-
ered for calculating the agency costs. The findings 
indicated that there was a significant relationship 
between the competition effect in the product mar-
ket and agency costs when the confidence rate is 95 
percent; also the findings indicate that the debt rate 
has no significant effect on the agency costs. How-
ever, the stated findings indicated there was a nega-
tive and significant relation between the competi-
tion in the product market and agency costs because 
of directional control. In comparison as mentioned 
in the review history other writers such as Weetman 
et al. (2011) and Gul et al. (1998)assessed the audit-
ing fees  as the agency costs scale and their find-
ings were in harmonization with the findings from 
next study and Gal-Or (2007) observed a reverse 
relation in the findings and Baggs and De Bettig-
nies (2007) concluded that there was no relation be-
tween the competition in the product market and 
agency costs. Therefore, the study hypothesis was 
accepted. Therefore, we conclude that the compet-
itive pressures in the product market decrease the 
auditing wags as an agency cost and then the share-
holders decrease the costs concerning supervising 
agencies. The findings from examining the model 
variables coefficients indicate that there was a sig-
nificant and positive relation between the ratio of 
auditing organization concentration and operation-
al costs efficiency; in other words, when the compe-
tition increases between the companies in the prod-
uct market the ratio of operational costs to the sale 
increases in the companies. Also, the company size 
and the ratio of short–term debt to the long–term 
one has no significant effect on the ratio of opera-
tional costs to the sale.
Keywords: Agency theory, Agency costs, Audit-
ing fees, Market competition.
Introduction
Nowadays the auditing role is very essential 
and unavoidable in reinforcing the respondence 
and accounts description through requesting them 
and strengthening trust in fiscal report in line with 
public interest. In recent years on the tack of some 
companies and auditing institutions scandal there 
was some evidence indicating more request for au-
dit quality improvement and some considerable 
changes in accounting in the light of separation 
possession from management in companies. In past 
the possessors were the managers of the firm at the 
same time and we saw them in the same position 
and on the other hand, the possessors controlled all 
operations to increase the company value. Tech-
nologic progress and increasing need concerning 
capital led to create great capital markets and then 
possession separated from management; the main 
problem was to find the place of the control in the 
transaction to keep previous condition; on the other 
hand, how the control should be done ? Is it possible 
to control the director’s behaviour ? Does the direc-
tor move in line with the shareholder? By virtue of 
above statements agency means ‘ The power to be 
transferred to another one (Director) to take deci-
sion concerning financial and economical sources 
distribution or do service(s) by someone(Possessor) 
by virtue of a defined contract (Namazi,2005).
Agency relation is when the possessors ap-
point the directors as representatives (Agents) and 
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transfer considerable powers and responsibilities to 
them; such work division may increase the econom-
ic institution efficiency and effect though it needs 
complete directors’ trust in the agents. In the simple 
agency model the data asymmetry and interest con-
tradiction are the most important factors for incom-
plete trust which may lead to organize some mecha-
nisms maximizing the unity. The main hypothesis in 
the agency theory is on the basis of all the company 
beneficiaries’ interest in maximizing their own eco-
nomic interests; so on this basis it is possible to sup-
pose the economic institution as the geometric inter-
section of which each point originated from Greek 
thought and logic in a way that by virtue of Shruder’s 
and Clark’s view the main question is ‘ How much is 
the profit from doing a special work expected by ev-
eryone ? ’ The problems between the directors and 
possessors appear when the decisions taken by the 
directors increase their own interests but do not in-
crease the possessors’ or shareholders’ ones. In ad-
dition to the relation between the directors and pos-
sessors the relation between directors and auditors 
and the relation between the auditors and possessors 
may include some signification of agency.
In their studies Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
concluded that the agency costs are not correlated 
with the competition in the product market. Also 
Weetman et al. found that the auditing fees has re-
verse relation with the competition in the product 
market. By virtue of similar studies present study is 
to examine the relation between the competition in 
the product market and agency costs. Also the au-
diting services and operational costs efficiency have 
been considered as some aspect of the agency costs.
Literature Review
Auditing fees
Pricing auditing services is one of the interest-
ing subjects for many auditing researchers and until 
now many studies have been done in this regard. If 
employer and auditor know such factors, they will be 
useful for them. The auditing cost is a considerable 
number for many employers. Although great com-
panies with high sale and liquidity or some govern-
mental companies may pay easily such amount, for 
many small firms or ones with bad financial condi-
tion the amount may be a high payable amount. In 
sum, it is possible to decrease the amount and make 
it more bearable by knowing the factors effective on 
the auditing fees, negotiation and discussion on the 
amount and controlling the factors in the organi-
zation.
The auditor’s economic benefits are realized 
through paying fees  according to the contract con-
cluded with the employers. The auditors use differ-
ent factors to price the auditing services and many 
studies have been done in relation to know and as-
sess the factors (Sunder,1997).
When the sources available to the management 
increase the beneficiaries and relation with com-
pany increase, too and it leads to contradictory in-
terests so the beneficiaries should sustain the agen-
cy costs to harmonize their interests with others’ 
and decrease the damages from the contradiction 
¬(Stein and Simunic, 1996).
Having studied auditing services pricing it be-
came known that the factors effective on the audit-
ing fees  were defined by the factors effective on the 
auditing work size as an motive for auditing services 
fees. All auditors expect to stay in the market and 
have more exclusive profit in the auditing services 
market (Gul et al,1998).During auditing services 
pricing study the factors effective on auditing ser-
vices fees  are examined by the effect of the factors 
on three factors describing the unit namely risk, 
size and operation complexity.
The auditing fees is announced in the fiscal re-
ports and relates to previous year fiscal statements. 
Therefore, if great book tax differences indicate the 
validity of low profit quality and the auditor needs 
additional approaches to form the viewpoint, the ad-
ditional auditing work for that fiscal statement is in 
relation to the fiscal year even if the approaches of the 
end of the year would be executed in some months 
of the following year. if the fees are negotiated at the 
first of the auditing, there is an opportunity for the 
auditor to receive more fees than what expected at 
the end of the year (Harlow and Howe, 1993).
The auditing fees is high when the book tax dif-
ferences are high and negative and vice versa be-
cause the positive difference may include manage-
ment and high tax potentials 
The auditing fees has reverse relation with the 
production market competition. The relation be-
tween the production market competition and the 
auditing fees was examined as a sample of the agen-
cy cost (Weetman, Leventis, Caramanis, 2011).
By virtue of the findings the auditing fees appears 
where the competitive pressures decrease the share-
holders’ need to sustain the costs concerning super-
vising agencies.
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Operational costs efficiency
In present study the dependent variable is agen-
cy costs and we use an efficiency ratio namely the ra-
tio of operational costs to yearly sale as the agency 
costs scale. The efficiency ratios were used to assess 
the agency costs for the first time by Ang et al (2000).
In their study they used the ratio of operational costs 
to yearly sale to measure agency costs. The ratio of 
operational costs to yearly sale measures how much 
directors control the company operational costs and 
used as direct scale for agency costs namely when the 
ratio is higher the agency costs are higher, too. Ac-
cording to. (2005) the natural logarithm of the vari-
able was used in applying the dependent variable in 
order to adjust its fluctuations.
Agency theory
The brokerage relation is contractual by which 
a group (Possessors) appoints someone(s) as their 
agent or representative and makes him(her, their) 
as responsible and officer to do some defined du-
ties in the firm. It is necessary to transfer the power 
to take decisions in order to conclude contract; in 
such contract both parties (Representative and pos-
sessor) know that each of them wishes for personal 
gains. Considering the director may work not in line 
with the possessor’s gains and wishes for his own 
gains (Such as professional security, personal valid-
ity, allowances and salary, such gains may make di-
rectors avoid risky operations and then most prob-
ably their positions are blemished while they agree 
with the first result; Therefore, the gain is less than 
the rate expected by the possessors and then it may 
lead to a contradiction between the shareholders’ 
gains maximization and personal directors’ gains 
known as ‘agency problem or question’ (Nikooma-
ram and Banimahd, 2006).
When a company resorts to the lenders to fi-
nance the grantors are considered as the possessors 
who deliver their asset (The lent money) to the com-
pany directors and then the latter as the agent use it 
as the sources. If it is supposed that there is no law 
and regulations regarding the contract to be con-
cluded between the company directors and grant-
ors, most probably the director tries opportunisti-
cally to maximize his(her) own gains (Mashayekh 
and Esmaeili,2006).
Also there is agency relation between the firm 
grantors and their directors; in this relation it is sup-
posed that the grantor permits the director to ben-
efit from the facilities made available to the firm by 
the former; in other words, the director is permitted 
to take decisions regarding sources not belonging to 
him(her); here maybe the director does not work in 
line with the grantor’s gains. Therefore, it leads to 
some problems. This theory plays an important role 
in defining affirmative theory in accounting. The 
agency problems lead to non-optimal decisions, 
improper of the sources and finally the company 
value decreases (Mashayekh Esmaeili, 2006).
One of the mechanisms which is important to 
transfer duties to directors by possessors is the fis-
cal statements to be issued by directors. It should be 
noted that the people in the community inherent-
ly try to increase their personal interests and so do 
the directors who are interested in presenting a fa-
vorable image of their firm to the shareholders and 
other beneficiaries in line with maximizing their 
personal interests and social welfare and fix their 
professional position. Here the problem is that the 
directors’ health increase is not necessarily in line 
with the others’ such as shareholders’. In fact, it in-
dicates that the directors’ gains are not in line with 
the beneficiaries’ in the firm. Therefore, in con-
sideration of the contradiction between the direc-
tors’ and possessors’ gains the firms directors may 
have the motive necessary to manipulate the gain to 
maximize their own gains (Leventis, 2010).
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets (ppe)
One of the mechanisms to be used to define the 
companies’ financial position is the financial ratios 
analysis. In fact, the financial ratios reveal impor-
tant realities in relation to financial operations and 
condition. When the ratios are calculated the rela-
tion between main items of financial statements is 
more precise. Also they are used to define the strong 
and weak points of the companies. Of course, the 
ratio are more significant when they are compared 
with previous ones of the same company, similar 
firms or favorable industrial standards.
In present study the fixed assets are used as to-
tal ones (PPE) (Pepall, L., Richards, D., and Nor-
man, G. (2008).The company’s noncurrent assets to 
total assets index indicates how much percent of the 
assets has been allocated to the fixed asset and long 
term investments; in other words, it indicates how 
much assets ratio to total ones may not change to li-
quidity in short–tem.
The sale ratio to industry (COMP)
The companies listed in Tehran stock exchange 
are categorized into different industries. The catego-
rization is done by ISIC method led to separate 36 
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industries in Tehran stock exchange. The sale ratio to 
industry is measured by considering a special com-
pany sale ratio to the total industry. Tehran stock ex-
change measures the price index for each industry to 
be calculated by a formula similar to total price in-
dex. In a more general division the companies listed 
in Tehran stock exchange are divided into two indus-
trial and financial groups including financial inter-
mediary industry and stock exchange (Except finan-
cial intermediary) companies, respectively. Tehran 
stock exchange measures the price for both general 
groups to be issued as financial and industrial indexes 
and both of them follow total price index scales to de-
sign, measure and adjust.
Previous studies 
Gul et al. (1998) examined the effect of the direc-
tors’ powers as the agency cost scale on pricing audit-
ing services in Hong Kong. The data were accumu-
lated from the companies listed in Hong Kong stock 
exchange and the sample included 70 companies. By 
virtue of above data accumulated by different statisti-
cal methods such as regression one it may claim that 
the agency costs influence pricing auditing services 
and it is possible to take into account them in pricing 
auditing services.
Jagannathan and Srinivasan (2000) examined the 
effect of competition on agency costs in U.S.A.; the 
agency costs were measured by the assets flow. The 
data were accumulated from the companies listed 
in U.S.A. stock exchange and the sample included 
165 companies. By virtue of above data different in-
dustries were separated by different statistical meth-
ods such as regression one. Therefore, it may claim 
that the competition in market influences the agency 
costs reversely.
(2001) examined the competition effect in prod-
uct market and agency costs; his sample included 897 
European companies in 1980–1996; the agency costs 
was measured by the ratio of operational costs to sale; 
the findings indicated that there is a negative and sig-
nificant relation between the competition in prod-
uct market and agency costs. Al. the ratio of lending 
from banking system to total debts and ratio of short– 
term debt to total debts and the number of unbound 
members of board of directors are the mechanisms 
decreasing the agency costs.
Leventis and Weetman (2011) examined the re-
lation between the competition intensity in product 
market and agency cost by analyzing theoretical-
ly and regression in 174 companies listed in Ath-
ens stock exchange. The auditing fees cost and work 
hours were used substitution for agency costs and in-
dustry sale percent and concentration ratio was used 
as the competition variables in the product market; 
the findings indicated that the product market range 
in actual markets limits have reverse relation with the 
auditing fees and the supervision decrease is compen-
sated by increasing management’ supervision by the 
competitors.
Hypotheses Development
The presence and range of the agency costs de-
pends on the nature of supervision (Auditing) costs 
for nonfinancial gains and financing directors who 
are able to invest and sustain the risk out of their per-
sonal assets. If the supervision costs are zero, natu-
rally the agency ones are zero or if the directors are 
available enough to possess and direct all companies 
in an (Competitive or noncompetitive) industry, the 
agency costs are zero in the industry (Leventis and 
Weetman, 2011).It is necessary to have ideal con-
ditions to eliminate agency costs completely which 
are note practically visible; stated findings show that 
there is no relation between the product market com-
petition and supervision costs because of directional 
control (Leventisand Weetman, 2011).
In comparison other writers, for example, Baggs 
and De Bettignies(2007) and Srinvasanand Jaganna-
than (1999)have found a potential relation between 
the product market competition and supervision 
costs. Therefore, by virtue of above-mentioned cases, 
the following hypothesis were raised:
H1:When the product market competition increas-
es the operational costs efficiency increase, too.
In line with the study goal we try to find if there 
is any significant relation between the product mar-
ket competition and operational costs efficiency; in 
other words, have the independent variables the po-
tential to describe and define the dependent ones; in 
line with this in harmonization with Ang et al. (2000), 
Fleming et al.(2005) and Florakis (2008) the efficien-
cy ratios were namely the ratio of operational costs to 
the yearly sale was used as the agency costs scales and 
above hypothesis was defined.
H2: When the product market competition increas-
es the auditing fees decreases.
Considering the auditing fees  is one of the agen-
cy costs scales when the product market competition 
increases the auditing fees decreases. The findings of 
the hypothesis gained by Weetman et al. (2011) indi-
cate that market competition increase leads to agency 
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cots decrease. Largely in most conditions the com-
petition pressure decreases the prices proposed by 
producing companies and firms presenting services 
and the fees s proposed by auditing organization and 
trusty auditing firms in Tehran stock exchange were 
not exception.
Methodology 
The model to be used to test H1 is as follows:
OC=b0+B1PPEj+b2CP+B3COMPj+B4SIZEj+
B5CURRENTj+B6QUICKj+B7 SUBj+ B8 ROAj+B9 
LOSS j + B10 REM +B11CHAN+B12bd+B13 
DE+B14comp2j
14)In the model the dependent variable is opera-
tional costs efficiency. The efficiency ratios were used 
to assess the agency costs for the first time by Ang et 
al (2000). In their study they used the ratio of opera-
tional costs to yearly sale to measure the agency costs. 
The ratio of operational costs to yearly sale measures 
how directors control the company operational costs 
and is used as the direct scale of agency costs namely 
when the ratio is higher the agency costs are higher, 
too.
The model to be used to test H2 is as follows:
AF=b0+B1PPEj+b2CP+B3COMP1j+B4SIZEj+
B5CURRENTj+B6QUICKj+B7 SUBj+ B8 ROAj+B9 
LOSS j + B10 REM +B11CHAN+B12bd+B13 
DE+B14comp2j
In the model the dependent variable is auditing 
services fees . In most studies concerning the auditing 
fees it is calculated as natural logarithm to be paid as 
related services to the auditing company during the 
year (LAF) (Gujarati, 2009).
The used independent variables, auditing organi-
zation concentration ratio (Comp1),industry sale ra-
tio (Comp2),the ratio of assets and gross equipments 
to total assets (PPE), the ratio of sale costs to total 
sale (cps) and control variables to be assessed include:
DE: The ratio index of book debts value to own-
ers’ equity.
SIZE: Company size to be measured by sake log-
arithm (Sale ln).
CURRENT: Current assets ratio gained by divid-
ing current assets by total ones.
QUICK: Speed ratio.
SUB: The companies with subgroups and affili-
ated groups 1, otherwise zero.
ROA: The ratio of profit before interest and tax 
deduction to total assets.
LOSS: If the companies under assessment have 
sustained loss last year, it is 1, otherwise zero.
REM: The type of auditing report is 1, if it is fa-
vorable, otherwise zero.
CHAN: Dummy variable: It is 1, if the compa-
ny auditor has changed from previous year, otherwise 
zero.
bd: The debt ratio which is gained by dividing 
short–term debt by the long–term one.
Data analysis
The descriptive statistics of the study variables are 
shown in Table 1.
Statistic Mean Middle standard deviation Minimum maximum
auditing fees  5/555 5/519 0/675 2/3 8/24
operational costs efficiency 0/188 0/165 0/179 0/41 0/.89
industry sale ratio index 0/097 0/026 0/189 0/05 0/.64
the ratio of assets and equipments to total assets 0/381 0/345 0/245 0/006 0/93
the ratio of distribution and sale costs to total sale 0/101 0/034 0/204 0/000 0/.87
the ratio of book debts value to owners’ equity 2.6 1/934 4/14 9/510 19/48
company size 12/669 12/.46 1/407 9/16 17/7
the ratio of current assets to total assets 1/259 1/16 0/.621 0/014 3/53
speed ratio 0/731 0/683 0/438 0/006 2/02
the companies with subgroups and affiliated groups 0/161 0/000 0/368 0/000 1/000
the ratio of profit before interest and tax deduction 
to total assets
0/169 0/128 0/161 0/150- 0/65
companies with loss in previous year 0/122 0/000 0/328 0/000 1/000
the ratio of short–term debt to the long–term one 0/862 0/928 0/158 0/22 1/000
the auditor’s view 0/33 0/000 0/471 0/000 1/000
auditor change 0/139 0/000 0/347 0/000 1/000
auditing organization concentration ratio 0/279 0/000 0/449 0/000 1/000
Table 1. The descriptive statistics of the study variables
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Having examined the descriptive statistics of the 
study variables the dependent variables normality 
(Agency costs variables) by Kolmogorov and Smirnov 
test and normal distribution figure. The findings re-
sulted from Kolmogorov and Smirnov test are shown 
in Table 2; as you see the test statistic and significance 
related to all agency costs scales are more than 0.05 
indicating the examined variables are normal.
dependent variables number of observations test statistic significance
auditing cost 336 1/187 0/12
operational costs efficiency 336 1/401 0/064
R R2 statistic ‘F’ statistic ‘F’ significance Durbin–Watson statistic
0/619 0/602 36/39 0/000 1/87
Table 2. The findings resulted from Kolmogorov and Smirnov test
Table 3. The findings from examining generally the model-H1
examined companies in product market the ratio of 
operational costs to the sale increase in the compa-
nies, too. Therefore, H1 is accepted in confidence 
rate of 95 percent. Also the coefficients, statistic ‘t’ 
and significance related to the control variables indi-





stable rate 0/03 0/574 0/052 0/567
the ratio of assets and equipments to total assets 0/059 2/786 0/021 0/006
the ratio of distribution and sale costs to total sale 0/135 2/782 0/019 0/016
industry sale ratio 0/042 4/901 0/009 0/000
the ratio of book debts value to owners’ equity -0/16 -3/585 0/001 0/000
company size -0/274 -2/902 0/003 0/008
the ratio of current assets to total assets -0/024 -2/677 0/009 0/008
speed ratio 0/057 6/042 0/009 0/000
the companies with subgroups and affiliated groups -0/013 -1/162 0/011 0/246
the ratio of profit before interest and tax deduction to 
total assets
-0/192 -5/721 0/034 0/000
companies with loss in previous year -0/015 -1/191 0/012 0/234
the ratio of short–term debt to the long–term one 0/083 1/095 0/027 0/092
the auditor’s view -0/148 -2/725 0/009 0/085
auditor change -0/006 -0/512 0/012 0/609
auditing size ratio 0/147 8/319 0/018 0/000
Table 4. Findings resulted from examining partial model coefficients–H1
The findings resulted from testing the study hy-
potheses:
H1:
The study variables were used to test H1; related 
findings and model estimation are shown in Tables 3 
and 4.
As you see in Table 3 the statistic ‘F’ amount and 
related significance indicate that the estimated re-
gression model is generally significant; in the model 
the definition coefficient is 0.619 namely 61.90 per-
cent of the dependent variable changes are explica-
ble by independent and control variables; the findings 
were gained from examining autocorrelation of error 
terms by Durbin–Watson statistic and considering 
the gained statistic is in the 1.5–2.5 range there is no 
autocorrelation between the model errors.
The findings resulted from examining the mod-
el variables coefficients are shown in Table 4. As you 
see in Table 4 the coefficient, t statistics and the sig-
nificance indicate related to the study independent 
variable indicate that there is a positive and signifi-
cant relation between the competition in product 
market and operational costs efficiency; In other 
words,when the competition increased between the 
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equity, company size, the ratio of current assets to to-
tal ones and dummy variable of the companies with 
subgroups and affiliated groups, the ratio of profit 
before interest and tax deduction to total assets and 
dummy variable, type of auditor’s view have negative 
and significant relation and the speed ratio has posi-
tive and significant relation with operational costs ra-
tio to the sale; however, the ratio of short–term debt 
to the long–term one and dummy variables namely 
auditor change and companies with loss in previous 
year had no significant effect on the ratio of opera-
tional costs to the sale.
H2:
The study variables were used to test H2; related 
findings and model estimation are shown in Tables 5 
and 6.
R R2 statistic ‘F’ statistic ‘F’ significance Durbin–Watson statistic
0/555 0/536 27/932 0/000 1/939
Table 5. The findings from examining generally the model-H2
As you see in Table 5 the statistic ‘F’ amount and 
related significance indicate that the estimated regres-
sion model is generally significant ;also the definition 
coefficient is 0.555 namely 55.5 percent of the depen-
dent variable changes are explicable by independent 
and control variables; the findings were gained from 
examining autocorrelation of error terms by Durbin–
Watson statistic and considering the gained statistic is 
in the 1.5–2.5 range there is no autocorrelation be-
tween the model errors.
The findings resulted from examining the mod-
el variables coefficients are shown in Table 6. As it is 
clear from Table 6, the coefficient, statistic ‘F’ and 
the significance indicate related to the study inde-
pendent variable indicate that there is a negative and 
significant relation between the competition in prod-
uct market and auditing fees; in other words, when 
the competition increased in product market the au-
diting fees decreases in the companies Therefore, H2 
is accepted in confidence rate of 95 percent. Also the 
coefficients, statistic ‘t’ and significance related to 
the control variables indicate that the speed ratio and 
auditor change have significant and negative relation 
with the ratio of book debts value to the owners’ eq-
uity, company size,the ratio of current assets to to-
tal ones, the ratio of profit before interest and tax de-
duction to total assets and type of auditor’s view have 
positive and significant relation with auditing fees; 
however, the companies with subgroups and affiliated 
groups, companies with loss in previous year and the 
ratio of short–term debt to the long–term one had no 
significant effect on the auditing fees.
Statistic Coefficients statistic ‘t’ standard deviation significance
stable rate 5/246 13/852 0/379 0/000
the ratio of assets and equipments to total assets -0/483 -3/094 0/156 0/002
the ratio of distribution and sale costs to total sale -0/64 -4/142 0/155 0/000
industry sale ratio -0/115 -2/842 0/063 0/016
the ratio of book debts value to owners’ equity 0/104 2/507 0/008 0/022
company size 0/76 3/435 0/022 0/001
the ratio of current assets to total assets 0/17 2/57 0/066 0/011
speed ratio -0/313 -4/533 0/069 0/000
the companies with subgroups and affiliated 
groups
0/127 1/571 0/081 0/117
the ratio of profit before interest and tax 
deduction to total assets
0/704 2/862 0/246 0/004
companies with loss in previous year 0/03 1/327 0/089 0/198
the ratio of short–term debt to the long–term 
one
-0/052 -1/61 0/198 0/295
the auditor’s view 0/221 3/074 0/063 0/001
auditor change -0/367 -4/553 0/081 0/000
auditing size ratio -0/497 -3/514 0/141 0/001
Table 6. The findings from examining the partial model coefficients–H2
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Conclusions
The findings from examining the model vari-
ables coefficients indicate that there is a significant 
and positive relation between the ratio of auditing 
organization concentration and operational costs 
efficiency; in other words ,when the competition in-
creases between the companies in the product mar-
ket the ratio of operational costs to the sale increas-
es in the companies .Also the company size and 
the ratio of short–term debt to the long–term one 
has no significant effect on the ratio of operation-
al costs to the sale. In comparison as mentioned in 
the review history other writers such as Jagannathan 
and Srinivasan(1991),Gal-Or(2007),Baggs and De 
Bettignies(2007),Taylor et al. (1989) used the oper-
ational costs efficiency and assets flow as the sub-
stitutions for the agency cost and found a potential 
positive relation between the competition intensity 
in market and agency costs similar to the findings 
from next study.
Jensen and Meckling claimed that the compe-
tition in the product market does not depend on 
the agency costs, but in another place in econom-
ic science history the theoretical and experimen-
tal study shows that the competition in the product 
market decreases the agency costs sustained by the 
companies through decreasing the auditing fees. We 
examined the relation between the competition in 
the product market and auditing fees as a sample of 
agency cost; the findings resulted from examining 
the model variable coefficients indicate that there is 
a negative and significant relation between the com-
petition in the product market and the auditing fees 
s; in other words, when the competition increases 
in the examined companies the product market the 
auditing fees  decreases in the companies. There-
fore, the study hypothesis is accepted Therefore, we 
conclude that the competitive pressures in the prod-
uct market decrease the auditing wags as an agen-
cy cost and then the shareholders decrease the costs 
concerning supervising agencies.
However, the stated findings indicate there is a 
negative and significant relation between the com-
petition in the product market and agency costs be-
cause of directional control.In comparison as men-
tioned in the review history other writers such as 
Weetman et al.(2011) and Gulet al. (1998)assessed 
the auditing fees as the agency costs scale and their 
findings were in harmonization with the findings 
from next study and Gal-Or (2007) observed a re-
verse relation in the findings and Baggs and De Bet-
tignies(2007) concluded that there is no relation be-
tween the competition in the product market and 
agency costs.
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